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CENSORNET: THE COMPETING
IDEALS OF CENSORSHIP AND
CYBERSPACE
Miles McCarthy'
This article examines current measures, both domestic and international, which attempt to
censor the emerging technologies Of the Internet. The attenuated application Of traditional
legislative regimes to such technologies is currently limited only by inherent prosecutorial
discretion. Recent legislative mechanisms seek to address the anomaly, only to replicate
assumptions concerning the modes and sites of liability. The increasing technological
convergence of media necessitates more informed and instructive approaches to the
institutions and objectives of censorship, a process which involves international
considerations.
I INTRODUCTION
Pornography has proliferated with each new tool, democratising what had been a more elite
possession and obsession, spreading the sexual abuse required for its making and promoted
through its use.1
The Internet, in relieving New Zealand from the "tyranny of geography",2 has
transformed national boundaries into seamless clouds. The current Internet is a global
system of co-operating networks, linking multifarious institutions and individuals, "[t]he
headless, anarchic, million-limbed Internet is spreading like bread-mould".3 There is no
This article was submitted as part of LLB (Honours) programme at Victoria University of
Wellington.
1 CA MacKinnon "Vindication and Resistance: A Response to the Carnegie Mellon Study of
Pornography in Cyberspace" (1995) 83 Geo U 1959, 1959.
2 Information and Technology Advisory Group "Impact 2001: How Information Technology will
Change New Zealand" http://www.netlink.co.nz/-itag/impact/impact.htm. (Please note
that the Universal Resource Locators cited are current as at 12 February 1997, but are subject to
change).
3 B Sterling "A Short History of the Internet" http://gopher.eff.org/links.html.
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central or co-ordinating body which administers the Internet and no country has universal
jurisdiction. As such a national legislature can only exercise effective control over domestic
residents and resources.
The adaptive routing capabilities of the Internet mean that information may travel
numerous interconnecting paths before reaching its final destination. The inability to
nullify a particular route and thus the dissemination of information has lead to the
observation that:4
Technology and censorship are often seen as opposing forces in the information age. Current
thinking suggests it is almost impossible to control information without at the same time
curtailing some of the benefits.
This article attempts an exposition of the current censorship laws in New Zealand in
relation to the Internet, and the proposals for reform.5 The Films, Videos, and Publications
Classification Act 1993, currently the governing legislation, and the Telecommunications
Act 1987 are examined. The Technology and Crimes Reform Bill 1994, mooted as the second
stage of censorship reform in New Zealand, is critiqued. Finally, recent United States
legislation and other regulatory proposals are assessed to the extent they provide possible
models for developing solutions in New Zealand.
II NEW ZEALAND
A Films, Videos, and Publications Class(fication Act 1993
The long title to the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 (FVPCA)
states that the Act is to "consolidate and amend the law relating to the censoring of films,
videos, books, and other publications".6 The title reflects the legislative impetus behind the
enactment of the FVPCA; to develop a coherent and unified censorship regime in place of the
sporadic coverage offered by the ad hoc development of previous legislation.
4 Above n 2.
5 The object of this paper is not to extrapolate the jurisprudence of censorship in New Zealand or
pronounce, at least explicitly, on the desirability of censorship. For a supportive assessment,
divorced from technical considerations, see JL Caldwell "Pornography - An Argument for
Censorship" (1992) 5 Cant LR 171.
6 Emphasis added.
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The appearance of consolidation was, however, dispelled early in the legislation's
formative process. A ministerial report on the intended BilF stated that:8
While the scope of the draft bill is very wide, it does not and cannot attempt to deal with
every form of pornographic representation...some forms of modern technology are not
amenable to regulation by way of a classification statute. Examples are the use of computer
links, radiocommunications and telecommunication facilities. Any difficulties with the law
relating to these media will have to be addressed separately.
The express denouncing of the legislation as providing coverage of non-tangible media,
an interpretation consistent with that of the Committee of Inquiry into Pornography,9 was
resonated throughout the Bill's legislative passage. The Ministry of Justice commented, in
an interim report, that the previous legislation (the Indecent Publications Act 1993, the
Films Act 1993, and the Video Recordings Act 1987) was "designed to govern the circulation
and exhibition of printed and visual matter which exists in a tangible form. The bill
describes a censorship/classification system which is suited to regulation of such
material".10
The suitability or otherwise of the FVPCA to encompass digital media arguably turns on
the interpretation given to "publication", as defined by section 2 of the Act. For the statute
to apply, media must be able to satisfy the term "publication", which is defined as:
(c) Any paper or other thing
(ii) On which is recorded or stored any information that, by use of any computer
or other electronic device, is capable of being reproduced or shown as any
word, statement, sign, or representation.
The definition is exclusive and "extends the scope of the legislation to catch some forms
of material representation which are not covered by existing law".11 The extension
provided by the use of the words "other thing" in combination with subparagraph (ii) is
7 Which did not materially differ from the enacted legislation.
8 New Zealand Department of Justice Films, Videos and Publications Class#ication Bill - Interim Report
(Wellington, April 1993) 4.
9 Above n 8.
10 Above n 8,1.
11 New Zealand Department of Justice Censorship and Pornography: Proposals for Legislation
(Wellington, 1990) 4.
352 (1997) 27 VUWLR
semantically and, arguably, practically significant. Potentially all online services currently
available provide and/or utilise information recorded or stored and capable of
representation by electronic or computer device.
The Ministry of Justice, while recognising "an extended definition of 'publication' that
can cover new forms of material representation",12 suggested the legislation would "catch
articles like computer discs and arcade video games",13 but that the Bill was "a wholly
unsuitable vehicle to address the difficult problems associated with...[modern
telecommunications] technology".14 The emphasis in the definition of "publication" on
tangible media may be said to colour the overall interpretation and application of the Act,
but it is inconsistent with the express words of the definition to impose such an arbitrary
restriction. The recognition of computer disks and arcade games cannot be conceptually
justified without the inclusion of other digital media storage facilities; whether hard disks,
servers, routers, or gateways.
The conceptual anomaly promoted may, however, be permissible when the practical
regulation and classification procedures of the FVPCA are considered. The classification
of a publication necessitates its submission to the Classification Office where a ruling on its
legal status under the Act can be made. The classification procedure presumes a tangible
medium which is capable of submission, without which the classification and the
subsequent regulation or prohibition of restricted or objectionable material cannot be
enforced:15
The regulatory regime described in the bill can work very effectively for material
("publications") that has a physical form. However, quite apart from any other consideration,
this system cannot deal with the simple transmission of pornographic images because a
determination that the images are "objectionable" cannot be made if there is no physical
record of the image that can be classified. The related problems of prevention, detection, and
enforcement are, in this context, virtually insuperable.
The isolation of the statute essentially tangible focus does not, however, necessitate
precluding the administration of the FVPCA in relation to digital media. The transmission
of data necessarily involves the flow of information already stored or recorded. The
potential liability under the FVPCA for digital media susceptible to the classification
process was acknowledged by the Ministry of Justice, "the mechanisms for seizure,
12 Abovenll.
13 Above n 8.
14 Above n 8.
15 Above n 8.
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classification, prosecution an disposal could be made to work if a hard copy is
available".16 The significant applicable offence provisions of the FVPCA include sections
123 and 131.
123. Offences of Strict Liability Relating to Objectionable Publications -
(1) Every person commits an offence against this Act who-
(a) Makes an objectionable publication; or
(b) Makes a copy of an objectionable publication for the purposes of supply,
distribution, display, or exhibition to any other person; or
(c) Supplies, or has in that person's possession for the purposes of supply, an
objectionable publication; or
(d) For the purposes of supply to any other person, distributes, displays,
advertises, or exhibits an objectionable publication; or
(e) In expectation of payment, or otherwise for gain, or by way of advertisement,
distributes, displays, exhibits, or otherwise makes available an objectionable
publication to any other person; or
(f) Delivers to any person an objectionable publication with intent that it should
be dealt with by that person or any other person in such manner as to
constitute an offence against this section or section 124 or section 127 or
section 129 of this Act.
(3) It shall be no defence to a charge under subsection (1) of this section that the
defendant had no knowledge or no reasonable cause to believe that the publication to
which the charge relates was objectionable.
(4) Without limiting the generality of this section, a publication may be-
(a) Supplied (within the meaning of that term in section 2 of this Act) for the
purposes of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of subsection (1) of this section; or
(b) Made available for the purposes of paragraph (e) of that subsection-
not only in a physical form but also by means of the electronic transmission (whether
by way of facsimile transmission, electronic mail, or other similar means of
communication, other than by broadcasting) of the contents of the publication.
16 Above n 8.
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The wording of section 123(4)(b) makes it clear that the provision of offences relating to
objectionable offences extends to electronic transmission. The ambit of the provision is
wide and would include not only the transmission from an individual user but both online
and closed networks.17 The section, while applicable to Internet Service Providers (ISPs)18
which create and manage content, arguably extends to pure access providers. The definition
of supply could be restricted to those ISPs who provide content rather than pure access
providers as the latter do not sell content but merely the access to such content. However, it
can be forcefully argued that pure access providers are embraced by section 123(1)(e) in
otherwise making available, if not distributing, any objectionable publication.
The section is one of strict liability, section 123(3) expressly excludes knowledge or
lack of reasonable belief as defences to a charge under the section. The potential liability of
ISPs who retain no, or minimal, editorial control is significant.
131. Offence to Possess Objectionable Publication -
(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5) of this section, every person commits an offence against
this Act who, without lawful authority or excuse, has in that person's possession an
objectionable publication.
The offence of possession of an objectionable publication, if the above interpretation is
to be consistent, extends to possession of digital media on computer and telecommunication
devices. As argued above, the inclusion of intangible media in such a form that it can be
reproduced for classification purposes prima facie poses no insurmountable conceptual or
operational barriers. The defining characteristic is that the data must be stored or recorded
in a form capable of being legally possessed.
Such a rudimentary analysis must, however, be tempered by the realities of modern
telecommunications. The ability to view does not correspond directly with actual physical
possession. The caching of data provides the temporary retention of media without the
necessity for recording or storing by the end user.19 The presence of section 123 indicates
that section 131 is directed toward protection of the individual and the resultant effects of
17 A closed network is one which provides no connection to the Internet.
18 "Internet Service Providers" can be rudimentally defined as commercial entities which charge a
monthly fee and offer modem access to computers or networks linked directly to the Internet;
and includes larger national commercial online services such as America Online, CompuServe,
Prodigy, and Microsoft Network which allow subscribers to access the Internet while providing
extensive content within their own proprietary networks.
19 The Department of Internal Affairs considers the issue of whether browsing the Internet is an
offence is a moot point, but states, "...if you download objectionable material onto disk you will
certainly be committing an offence", see "Pulling the Plug"
http://inform.dia.govt.nz/internal_affairs/businesses/grcr_inf/elect_censor.html.
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possessing objectionable material. If such a mischief is to be remedied then the extension of
possession to include such transient displays would be consistent. The complications of
such an approach must necessarily appear immediate; the requisite intention to exercise
control (including the degree of control) over the material is arguably not established, and
the enforcement of such an offence would be impractical.
The application of the FVPCA to stored or recorded digital media is evidenced by the
recent convictions of local Bulletin Board Service (BBS) operators under the FVPCA. The
search warrant used in one of these cases indicates the operational extension of the FVPCA
into the area of telecommunications:20
...the following property CD-Roms, Computer disks and tapes, Computers and [their]
ancillary [equipment]..., electronic backup devices, computer software, documentation and
accounts that relate to the supply of objectionable publications...are being kept for the purpose
of being so dealt with as to constitute an offence against section 123 of the Films, Videos, and
Publications Classifications Act 1993.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, in discussing New Zealand's third
periodic report on measures taken to comply with provisions of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, stated that: 21
..it was not the job of the State to overreact concerning objectionable material. It was more
suitable for the individual to deal with such issues. The definition of objectionable material
was so vague it created serious problems. Vague codes did not serve the needs of the society.
Although such sentiments are apparently moot in regard to reforming the FVPCA, they
provide a schema for the interpretation of the legislation in relation to the Internet. The
FVPCA offence provisions are capable of addressing objectionable content on domestic
proprietary networks and other forms of computer and telecommunications hardware. The
imposition of absolute liability is arguably unjustified on policy grounds in relation to the
temporary storage of content on network routers, and caching servers, without control or
knowledge of the material.22 Further, the mere downloading of information, without more,
should not attract the substantial penalties resultant on the enforcement of offence
provisions.
20 Department of Internal A#airs v Merry [1996] DCR 147, 148.
21 UN Docs CCPR/C64/add 10 HRI/CORE/1/add 33. in Sky Network Television Ltd, Submission
on the Technology and Crimes Reform Bill, July 1996, 7.
22 The Department of Internal Affairs has stated that content harboured on servers would be
subject to liability, the use of the term "harbour" arguably implies knowledge and control over the
information, see Department of Internal Affairs "Pulling the Plug"
http://inform.dia.govt.nz/internal_affairs/businesses/grcr_inf/elect_censor.html.
y
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B Telecommunications Act 1987
Sections 8 and 8A (the dial-a-porn section) of the Telecommunications Act deal with the
use of profane, indecent, or obscene language or suggestions in connection with a telephone
station. The latter section omits the section 8 requirement of intentionally offending the
recipient, while including the qualifier that the purpose of the use must be the procurement
of any pecuniary gain or commercial benefit. Therefore, assuming these sections encompass
the technologies under consideration, the altruistic distributor (having neither an intention
to offend or pecuniary motive) can act with impunity.
"Telephone station", as defined by section 2(1) of the Telecommunications Act, means
"any terminal device capable of being used for transmitting or receiving any communications
over a network designed for the transmission of voice communication". The general nature
of the definition threatens to embrace, not only computers, but network routers and
gateways. Such devices are not intended to store information for extended periods but act
as nodes which interconnect networks and route data.23
The wording of sections 8(1) and 8A, by including the terms "language" and "suggestion",
could arguably extend to the transmission of digital media as "suggestion" in this context
impliedly includes more than mere words. However, such a literal interpretation is
arguably counter to the overall intention of the sections24 and the structure of section
8(2)(a):
any telephone station [used] for the purpose of disturbing, annoying, or irritating any
person, whether by calling up without speech or by wantonly or maliciously transmitting
communications or sounds, with the intention of offending the recipient...
The contrast of speech and the transmission of communications emphasises the latter's
broad application. The omission of such language in sections 8(1) and 8A implies that these
sections are confined to the conveyance of profanity, indecency and obscenity by voice.
While the above provisions of the Telecommunications Act are arguably not applicable
in providing integral regulatory provisions concerning the Internet, the nature of
telecommunication networks ensures that certain definitions and provisions have the
potential to influence the form and content of proposed legislation, such as the Technology
and Crimes Reform Bill.
23 The Executive Committee of the Tuia Society and Information Technology Services VUW,
Submission on the Technology and Crimes Reform Bill, July 1994, 5.
24 See A Lewis Censoring New Telecommunications Technology (Department of Internal Affairs,
Wellington, 1989) 22.
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C Technology and Crimes Reform Bill 1994
Trevor Rogers,25 on introducing the Technology and Crimes Reform (TCR) Bill, was
transparent in his intention that the proposed legislation constituted the second stage of the
Films, Videos and Publications Classification Act:26
The politics of this Bill are quite simple. They are to regulate electronic sounds, images and
live-pornography shows, and telecommunication and foreign telecommunication services
with amendments to the Broadcasting Act, and to deal with proposed foreign satellite
services; and then to link all those parts to a standard identical to those of the Films, Videos
and Publications Classification Act so that the product of those technological areas can be
examined by the classification office and classified as objectionable or acceptable.
Part I of the Bill deals with the creation of offences and penalties relating to
objectionable images, sounds and live shows, and for appropriate classification under the
tenets of the FVPCA. The governing assumption is that images and sounds are not covered
by existing legislation, and more specifically, do not fall within the definition of publication
in the FVPCA. Clause 3 adopts the meaning of objectionable as defined by section 3 of the
FVPCA for the purposes of the Bill , "as if images, sounds, live shows, programmes, or
foreign satellite services were publications under the [FVPCA]".
Clause 6 of the Bill creates the principal offence relating to objectionable sounds and
images:
Subject to section 9 of this Act, every person commits an offence who broadcasts, transmits,
communicates, or receives, through or by any broadcasting or telecommunications link or any
electronic, light, sound, satellite, or laser transmission whatever, any objectionable image or
objectionable sound for pecuniary gain.
The amorphous nature of the clause, evident by the compendious terms used, reflects the
desire of the framers to implement a comprehensive regime. The communication of
objectionable images or sounds by or through any telecommunications link or similar device
clearly encompasses digital media provided using current, and potential, mediums. The
offence is one of strict liability, subject only to those exemptions and defences expressly
provided for under clauses 9 and 10 of the Bill.
25 MP, Howick.
26 NZPD, vol 540, 1342, 1 June 1994.
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The exceptions from criminal liability detailed under clause 9 parallel those under the
FVPCA. Clause 10(1) provides that:
It shall be no defence to a charge under section 6 or section 7 of this Act that, the defendant
had no knowledge or no reasonable cause to believe that the image, sound, or live show to
which the charge relates was objectionable.
The definition of objectionable and the pervasiveness of the proscription threaten the
creation of a regulatory environment in which ISPs and users face extensive criminal
liability. The Bill makes no attempt to rationally distinguish between parties with editorial
control and mere conduits. Clause 10(4) provides a defence to clause 6 where a network
operator "had no knowledge or no reasonable cause to believe that the image or sound to
which the charge relates was objectionable". A network operator, as defined under section
2 of the Telecommunications Act 1987, is a common carrier such as Telecom, Clear, and
Bellsouth, not an ISP. The defence is one remove from ISPs which utilise telecommunications
networks to provide connections but have no editorial control and act as conduits.
Regardless of whether ISPs generate content or exercise minimal editorial control, the
nature of the data volume and network connections make the imposition of strict liability
unjust. An ISP can neither screen all (nor even a significant portion of) content provided by
clients let alone the vast resources which users may seamlessly access from international
sources. Nor are they legally capable of effecting such monitoring as, by virtue of section
216B of the Crimes Act, the use of listening devices is prohibited.27 Under Clause 6, by
virtue of such enveloping words as "transmit" and "communicate", a criminal offence would
be committed by an ISP upon the passing of data constituting an objectionable image or
sound through their service.
The formulation of a defence for network operators has itself been criticised on the
basis that a defence necessarily entails submission to the criminal process. Network
operators argue that the expense and stigma of having to provide evidence establishing a
defence under the Bill is too onerous. The suggested alternative is to exempt network
operators completely under clause 9 of the Bill and therefore cement the impunity of mere
conduits. The future convergence of the telecommunications industry and the provision of
multifarious services by current network operators may blur the categorisation of entities.
27 Clause 14, which removes the prohibition in respect of a belief (on reasonable grounds) by the
Police that an offence under clause 6 or 7 is being committed, is arguably ineffective as s216B
constitutes a prohibition, not an empowering provision, see The New Zealand Law Society,
Submission on the Technology and Crimes Reform Bill, August 1994, 5. John Edwards, an
information and privacy lawyer, has commented that the Police may not need a warrant to
intercept e-mail communications, an area governed by the Privacy Act principles and s6 of the
Telecommunications Act 1987: R Hosking "Police Need No Warrant to Tap Email, Says Top
Lawyer" (1996) Computerworld 3.
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The focus should arguably be on the potential and actual control exercised by an entity
over content and dissemination of information.
The potential criminal liability faced by Internet users under the Bill is similarly
threatening. Clause 6 imposes strict liability on any person who receives objectionable
material through a telecommunications network. The strict offence of possession under
section 131 of the FVPCA requires, as conventionally defined at common law,28 at least
some intention to exercise power and control over the object. Section 131 would therefore
potentially exclude, as argued above, a user who merely browses the Internet. Clause 6 of
the Bill imposes considerably broader liability and would arguably extend to the mere
downloading of information, the content of which a user may have limited or no knowledge.
Arguably, "receive" could be read, in line with the canon of interpretation that criminal
statutes should be construed narrowly, as implying a conscious act of acceptance. This
could take either of two forms; exclude merely unsolicited information from liability, or
additionally, the unintended content of requested information. Extension to the latter
interpretation is arguably not warranted on either semantic or practical grounds.
The above analysis has focused on the application of the Bill's offence provisions
abstracted from the classification process. Clauses 3 and 13 of the Bill expressly adopt
definitions and incorporate sections of the FVPCA. The classification regime imposed by
the Bill does not, however, parallel that governing tangible publications. Clause 8 provides
that:
A person may be convicted of an offence under section 6 or section 7 of this Act if the image,
sound, or live show is in all the circumstances objectionable, notwithstanding that it is a part
only of an image, sound, or live show that is not objectionable.
The clause is subject to an internal tension between an assessment in "all the
circumstances" that an image or sound is objectionable and the discretion to ignore the work
as a whole. Section 3(4) of the FVPCA states that in defining a publication as objectionable
the Classification Office shall consider:
(a) The dominant effect of the publication as a whole:
(b) The impact of the medium in which the publication is presented:...
Clause 3 of the Bill expressly adopts the definition of objectionable under section 3 of
the FVPCA. The specific nature of clause 8 clearly overrides the application of section
3(4)(a) of the FVPCA. The result is an anomaly between the regulation of tangible and
28 See R v Cugullere [1961] 1 WLR 858.
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intangible media, for which there is no clear policy justification.29 The nature of digital
multi-media is such that the separation of a discrete sound or image from a complete work
could lead to substantial bias and imbalance in its classification.
The incongruous relationship between the FVPCA and the Bill is compounded by the
provisions of clause 12. Whereas in relation to live shows the categorisation of
publications parallels that of the FVPCA, the provisions concerning images and sounds are
in stark contrast. Section 23(2) of the FVPCA allows a publication to be classified as
objectionable except if restricted on the grounds of age, class of persons, or use for specified
purposes, and is restated in relation to live shows in Clause 12(4) of the Bill. Clause 12(3)
provides that the Classification Office, after considering matters referred to in section 3 of
the FVPCA, shall classify the image or sound as either unrestricted or objectionable. The
omission of the specified exceptions from objectionable classification in clause 12(3)
imposes an absolute demarcation between unrestricted circulation and complete censorship.
The consequences of such absolutes must be the enlarging of either category to subsume the
retrenched area. The probable conclusion, considering that the omitted restrictions are
exceptions from objectionable status, would be the entrenchment of a low threshold of
objectionability which would be directed at the lowest common denominator, namely
children.
In the alternative, if the exceptions to objectionable classification set out in section 23(2)
of the FVPCA were adopted in relation to images and sounds, the nature of the Internet
would make practical enforcement unachievable. The routing capability of the Internet,
combined with the possible anonymity of both source and receiver, bar the confinement of
images or sounds to particular persons or classes of persons or for particular purposes.
Similar considerations apply to clause 12(5) of the Bill which empowers the classification
of publications which would otherwise be objectionable, as restricted in order to be made
available for "educational, professional, scientific, literary, artistic, or technical purposes".
Part II of the Bill is directed at providing additional penalties for those convicted of an
offence involving the use of a telephone to "transmit objectionable material" and to "require
a network operator to prohibit telecommunication with foreign telecommunication services
29 While the FVPCA does not always require an assessment of the work as a whole (section 3(2)),
the TCR Bill completely removes the potential for such an assessment. For an extensive
interpretation of section 3 of the FVPCA see New Truth & TV Extra, 4 November 1994,
Unreported, June 1996, Film and Literature Board of Review, Decision 3/96.
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whose programmes contain objectionable images or objectionable sounds". The definition of
"programme" is that provided by section 2 of the Broadcasting Act 1989:
Programme
(a) Means sounds or visual images, or a combination of sounds and visual images, intended
(i) To inform, enlighten, or entertain; or
(ii) To promote the interests of any person; or
(iii) To promote any product or service; but
(b) Does not include visual images, whether or not combined with sounds, that consist
predominantly of alphanumeric text.
The definition, which encompasses sounds and visual images, corresponds with the
nature of an objectionable image or objectionable sound in clause 6 of the Bill. The
qualifications contained in subparagraphs (i), (ii), and (iii) would, given the broad nature
of such words as "inform, enlighten, or entertain", include most digital media. However, the
proviso contained in (d) excludes media which consists principally of text. While this does
not affect media with arguably the greatest potential impact and influence it does exclude a
significant portion of Internet traffic.30
The cardinal misnomer in Part II of the Bill is arguably the requirement, in clause 18, of
prohibiting telecommunication with foreign services where, "...any image or sound which
forms part of any foreign telecommunications service [is]...objectionable".31 The ability of
network operators to comply with such a prohibition is constrained by both contractual
and technical limitations.32 In addition, blocking access to a foreign service would
30 For a more detailed discussion in the Canadian context, concerning virtually identical provisions,
see D Shap "Hate Crimes in the Electronic Media" (1994) http://catalaw.com/logic/docs/ds-
hate.htm.
31 Clause 21 defines a foreign telecommunications service as "...a person providing a service which
consists wholly or mainly in the telecommunication from a place outside New Zealand of
programmes which are capable of being received by a network in New Zealand". The isolation of
a singular image or sound, as argued above, could lead to substantial bias as large proprietary
networks which contain a wealth of information may be judged on the basis of a single
transmission.
32 Telecom routes overseas calls to international gateways which interpret the initial digits of the
telephone number and forward the call appropriately to international networks such as British
Telecom and AT&T (beyond the jurisdiction of New Zealand's domestic legislation), see Telecom,
Submission on the Technology and Crimes Reform Bill, August 1994, paras 4.5-4.9; Bellsouth is a
signatory to the GSM Memorandum of Understanding which contractually obliges it to allow
customers of other GSM networks to roam in New Zealand, see Bellsouth New Zealand,
Submission on the Technology and Crimes Reform Bill, August 1994, 3.
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necessarily involve obstructing transmission at an intermediate node, a regressive
proscription which can be readily circumvented.33 Such impediments have forced the
proposed deletion of clauses 18, 19 and 20 by the Select Committee in favour of developing
alternatives which focus on domestic providers and users.
Amendments proffered include broadening clause 10(4) to provide a defence where a
bulletin board operator or service provider contracts with users on the basis that the user
assumes full liability for any material which would be objectionable under New Zealand
law. The avoidance of criminal liability through contractual relations is precluded at
common law and there are similar policy arguments against its manifestation in statutory
provisions.34 Further, the potential for a standard form Internet contract raises questions
as to the possible content and variation of terms.35
The most significant amendment proposed at the select committee stage was the
imposition of a requirement that any person who owns or uses a computer accessible to
children under the age of 16 with an international network link be obliged to install and
maintain a security software program.36 The proposition, while rightly focusing on the
obligations of users, is uncertain in its scope and effect. Problems surround the definition of
"accessible"37 and the extension of the requirement to users of the computer as well as the
proprietor.
D Bill of Rights Act 1990
Section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states that "[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information
and opinions of any kind in any form". Clause 6, in providing for a complete ban on
communication of objectionable material, prima facie is inconsistent with such a right. The
Report of the Attorney-General, made under section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act and tabled in
the House of Representatives,38 attests to the inconsistencies of clauses 6, 7, 14(2) and
33 Users may simply establish access with foreign providers or use various international call back
features. The prohibition is regressive in that successive services, assuming detection, would
likely be prohibited until the eventual isolation of the local network.
34 See The New Zealand Law Society, Submission on the Technology and Crimes Reform Bill, July
1996, 2.
35 See MA Lemley "Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace" (1995) 35 Jurimetrics J 311.
36 Suitable security programs would be determined by the Classification Office and an appropriate
offence provision (not having such a program installed and operational) created.
37 It is unclear whether the term contemplates access under normal circumstances or extends to
unauthorised access, see above n 34,3.
38 NZPD, vol 542,3028,24 August 1994.
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29(4)29 notwithstanding the potential for justified limitations and preferred interpretation
under sections 5 and 6 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Overall, the failure of the TCR Bill is its inability "to recognise the practical realities of
value-added network operation in a modern communications and multi-media
environment".40 The Bill attempts to impose an existing classification framework in a
simplistic manner by attaching liability to entities, such as network operators and ISPs,
without consideration for their functions and limitations. Trevor Rogers, MP, has
commented that the scheme will be triggered by complaints and that prosecutorial discretion
will ensure that criminal provisions are not enforced in an oppressive manner.1 While the
offence to the rule of law such a proposal presents must be noted,42 a complaints based
system is arguably circular in that it duplicates essential provisions of the FVPCA.
III THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 1996
In enacting Title V, known as the Communications Decency Act (CDA) 1996, of the
Telecommunications Act 1996, the American Congress expressly acknowledged that the
Internet represents "an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources to our citizens" and accordingly maintained:43
[i]t is the policy of the United States...to promote the continued development of the Internet
and other interactive computer services; [and] to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.
39 Clauses 6 and 7 were reported to be apparently inconsistent with section 14 of the Bill of Rights
Act; clause 14(2) was deemed to breach section 21 (the right to be secure against unreasonable
search and seizure); and clause 29(4) was assumed to be in breach of section 25C (right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty), see above n 38.
40 The Executive Committee of the Tuia Society and Information Technology Services VUW,
Submission on the Technology and Crimes Reform Bill, July 1994, 1.
41 Commerce Select Committee Hearing on Technology and Crimes Reform Bill, 31 July 1996.
42 See, for a detailed exposition of what the "rule of law" encompasses, PA Joseph Constitutional and
Administative Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1993) 167.
4 3 Section 509 of the Communications Decency Act 1996.
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A ACLU v Ren044
A conglomerate of plaintiffs45 applied in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of provisions
challenged on constitutional grounds as infringing the rights protected by the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The challenges to section
223(a)(1)(B) (the indecency provision) and section 223(d)(1) (the patently offensive
provision)46 did not concern obscenity or child pornography, proscribed prior to the
enactment of the CDA,47 but the vagueness and overbreadth of the criminal provisions.48
The central provisions of section 223 are as follows:
(a) Whoever -
(1) in interstate or foreign communications-..
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is
obscene or indecent knowing that the recipient of the
communication is under 18 years of age regard less of whether
the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated
the communication.
(d) Whoever -
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
44 American Civil Liberties Union v Reno 929 F Supp 824 (1996).
45 The plaintiffs, led by the ACLU, were many and diverse, ranging from civil liberty organisations
to large corporate entities.
46 "Indecent" and "patently offensive" are used interchangeably in the court's decision as any
distinction, although arguably justified by statutory interpretation, was not crucial to the
plaintiffs claim; see above n 44,850.
47 See 18 USC ss1464-65 (criminalizing obscene material) and 18 USC ss2251-52 (criminalizing child
pornography).
48 The challenges also indirectly encompassed s223(a)(2) and s223(d)(2) which make it an offence
to "knowingly permit" any telecommunications facility under a persons control to be used for the
proscribed conduct in s223(a)(1) and s223(d)(1).
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(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age, any comment, request suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual
or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service
placed the call or initiated the communication...
(e)(5) It is a defence to a prosecution under subsection (a) or (d) that a person-
(A) has taken in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under
the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication
specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to
restrict minors from such communications, including any method which is
feasible under available technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a verified
credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification
number.
The presumptive invalidity of content-based regulation led the court to apply a "strict
scrutiny standard of review"49 which would uphold the CDA only if "justified by a
compelling government interest and...narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest".50 The
court made extensive findings of facts which necessarily influence and pervade the legal
conclusions reached. Internet communications were approximately delineated into several
categories:51
(1) one-to-one messaging (such as "e-mail"),
(2) one-to-many messaging (such as 'listserv"),
(3) distributed message databases (such as "USENET newsgroups"),
(4) real time communication (such as "Internet Relay Chat"),
49 The less than strict standard applied in FCC v Pacifica Foundation 438 US 726 (1978) and other
broadcasting cases, as argued by the defendants, was therefore inapplicable.
50 Above n 44, 851.
51 Above n 44,834
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(5) real time remote computer utilisation (such as "telnet"), and
(6) remote information retrieval (such as "ftp," "gopher," and the "World Wide Web").
The court emphasised that "receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of
affirmative steps"52 and that the ubiquitous anonymity of users made it "...either
technologically impossible or economically prohibitive for many of the plaintiffs to comply
with the CDA without seriously impeding their...constitutional right[s]".53
The court was unanimous in "inexorably"54 upholding the plaintiffs claim that the
relevant provisions were overbroad in reaching speech which is protected under the First
Amendment. The reliance on third party co-operation (not enforced by the statute), purely
hypothetical technical suppositions, and the resultant burden placed on a myriad of content
providers, necessitated the conclusion that the statutory defences provided by section
223(e)(5) were inapplicable.
The majority,55 while recognising such considerations entrenched on other areas, upheld
the plaintiffs contention that the CDA was unconstitutionally vague. Buckwalter J, after
noting that previous cases defined indecency with reference to contemporary community
standards for the particular medium under consideration, held that the CDA encapsulated
no such limitation but instead embodied a conflict between an apparent intention to impose
a national standard and the prosecutorial requirement of a fluctuating community standard.
Accordingly, he found "indecent [to be] unconstitutionally vague, and...the terms in context
and patently offensive also so vague as to violate the First and Fifth Amendments".56
Dalzell J, dissenting as to constitutional vagueness, favoured a "medium-specific
approach to mass communication [which] examines the underlying technology of the
communication to find the proper fit between First Amendment values and competing
interests".57 Dalzell J held that "the Internet deserves the broadest possible protection from
government-imposed, content-based regulation",58 which manifested in the denial that
Congress may regulate indecency on the Internet, a prospect the majority expressly left open.
52 Above n 44,845.
53 Above n 44,854.
54 Above n 44,855.
55 Sloviter CJ and Buckwalter J.
56 Above n 44,858.
57 Above n 44,873.
58 Above n 44, 881.
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The much maligned marketplace theory of First Amendment jurisprudence,59 emphasising the
low barriers to entry and the relative parity of speakers, underscored such conclusions
which Dalzell J viewed as following inescapably from the findings of fact.
The court, implicitly highlighting the apparent redundancy of the legislation, was
emphatic in maintaining that the conclusion of facial unconstitutionality did not expose
minors:60
Vigorous enforcement of current...laws should suffice to address the problem the government
identified in court and which concerned Congress...the Justice Department itself
communicated its view that [the CDA] was not necessary because it was prosecuting online
obscenity, child pornography and child solicitation under existing laws, and would continue
to do so.
The applicability of current obscenity legislation, and the rejection of a fundamental
tangible/intangible distinction, is evidenced by United States v Thomas,61 in which a
criminal provision62 which proscribed the transportation of obscene material was
purposively interpreted so as to encompass downloading from an adult Bulletin Board
Service.63
B Shea u Reno64
Shea v Reno concerned a more limited challenge of facial unconstitutionality toward the
CDA. Joseph Shea,65 who refused to join the ACLU lead coalition, sought a preliminary
injunction on behalf of the American Reporter to restrain the Department of Justice from
enforcing section 223(d) of the CDA. The District Court for the Southern District of New
York, noting the contemporaneous nature of the ACLU decision,66 declined to apply the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, instead collating extensive findings of fact.
59 Above n 44,879; the assumptions of such a theory (that the truth (or an ideal) is identifiable,
preferable, and as such will prevail) are arguably rebutted by the "requirement" to censor the
Internet, if the Internet is accepted as most closely achieving the free flow of information.
6 0 Above n 44,856-857.
61 Unreported, 28 July 1994, WD Tenn, No. 94-20019-G.
62 18 USC s1465.
63 DD Burke "Cybersmut and the First Amendment: a Call for a New Obscenity Standard" (1996) 9
Harv JL & Tech 87, 118.
64 930 F Supp 916 (1996).
65 An editor, publisher, and part-owner of the American Reporter; a newspaper distributed solely
by telecommunications.
66 ACLU was decided on 11 June, 1996; Shea was decided on 29 July, 1996.
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The court recognised the same modes of access and communication concerning the
Internet as were enunciated in ACLU, cognisant that such categories were dynamic with
regard to the convergence of traditional media into "common forms of communication".67 The
court established that sexually explicit material did not constitute a significant portion of
Internet content and further, that "...accidental retrieval of sexually explicit material is one
manifestation of the larger phenomenon of irrelevant search results".68
Relying on the fact that previous challenges to indecency standards in relation to
various communication mediums have been found unavailing by Courts of Appeals, the
court, in findings directly contradictory to the majority in ACLU, denied the terms "indecent"
and "patently offensive" and the contemporary community standards measure were
unconstitutionally vague. The court held that liability for contravention of indecency
restrictions has not been bound to the ability of content providers to monitor and assess
contemporary community standards for a particular medium.69
Contrary to such conclusions, it can be argued that traditional Supreme Court
jurisprudence has been informed by outmoded assumptions of geographical and
sociocultural homogeneity.70 Arguably, the traditional burden placed on content providers
impliedly rests on the predominance of commercial providers and the ability to
geographically restrict distribution in such mediums, an issue which the court refused to
conclusively decide.71
The tension between analogy and selection of established legal doctrine, and developing
reactive jurisprudence,72 is evident in the consideration of contemporary community
standards measures. The possibility of forum shopping by prosecutors and the reduction of
content to the standard of the lowest common denominator, underpin arguments advocating
a return to national standards and the conceptualisation of the Internet as a virtual
67 Above n 64.
68 Above n 44,844; Shea determined that approximately 0.02% of all unique WWW sites contained
sexually explicit material, above n 63, 931.
69 In fact, the court argued the Internet may provide an easier means to assess the relevant
standard, above n 64,937.
70 Above n 63.
71 The court considered the issue one of overbreadth, but declined, in light of other conclusions
reached, to assess whether any such overbreadth was substantial, above n 64,938.
72 See RS Zembek "Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of
Cyberspace" (1996) 6 Alb U Sci & Tech 339; FH Cate "The First Amendment and the National
Information Infrastructure" (1995) 30 Wake For LR 1.
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community.73 The inter-jurisdictional nature of Internet communications can arguably be
accommodated by established doctrines of personal jurisdiction, operating within national
and international law, embodying requirements of minimum contact and due process.74
However, such doctrines reflect prescriptive rather than effective jurisdiction and have
been formulated in more static, geographically restrictive environments.
The court in Shea, while not sympathetic to the above arguments, were unpersuaded as
to the ability of content providers to avail themselves of the CDA's specified defences. The
verification of the age of users, requiring the implementation of extensive databases and the
sacrifice of anonymity, was deemed too "burdensome".75 Further, the provision of a good
faith defence, through screening, tagging and registering content,76 was ruled technically
infeasible.:77
[e]ven if it were established that the statute is to some limited extent effective in protecting
minors from sexually explicit material on line, and that nothing short of a total ban on
indecent communication could be as effective, it is not obvious that the benefits thus
achieved would outweigh the burden...
Both courts emphasised that "[b]ecause of the rapidity of developments in this field, some
of the technological facts we have found may become partially obsolete by the time of
publication of these [f]indings".78 The Internet cannot be defined and categorised as a
73 See FB Lim "Obscenity and Cyberspace: Community Standards in an On-line World" (1996) 20
Colum-VLA JL & Arts 291; the associated problems have also proved fertile ground for
arguments addressed toward abolishing censorship altogether in favour of personal injury based
torts, see above n 63.
74 See RS Zembek "Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of
Cyberspace" (1996) 6 Alb LJ Sci. & Tech 339. Minnesota provides an example of a more robust
approach: "Warning to all internet users and providers ...[p]ersons outside of Minnesota who
transmit information via the internet knowing that information will be disseminated in
Minnesota are subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota courts for violations of state criminal and
civil laws", "Minnesota Attorney-General Warning"
http://www.state.mn.us/ebranch/ag/memo.txt.
75 Association with "adult" verification services or the utilisation of CGI (common gateway
interface) scripts, costing approximately US$1 per transaction, were ruled economically
prohibitive, above n 64,934.
76 The court considered PICS and other tagging schemes and registration of sexually explicit
content in relation to both server and client software, above n 64.
77 Above n 64,941.
78 Above n 64,848. The Supreme Court has recently affirmed the decision of the District Court in
ACLU v Reno. Stevens J, who delivered the opinion of the court, held that the CDA "... places
an unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech, and that the defences do not constitute
the sort of 'narrow tailoring' that will save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional
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monolithic medium. The development of the Internet from its defence force origins represents
the emerging possibilities to which such a multi-layered value-added network can be
applied.79 In delineating the prevailing features and technology which currently exist it
must be remembered that the amorphous nature of the medium readily consigns such profiles
to historical analysis.
The ineffective nature of the CDA, in only regulating domestic content providers,80
underscores the findings in ACLU and Shea.81 The courts, while not explicitly pronouncing
on the sagacity of the legislation, were desirous of indicating that the statute actually
advantaged extra-territorial content providers who could act with impunity.
IV OTHER REGULATORY MODELS
The territorial limitations of domestic legislation necessarily preclude the effectiveness
of the above considered isolated attempts at regulation:82
Regulation is not an issue for each individual service provider or user or even nation. The
global nature of the network makes this a global problem and to be tackled effectively it must
be tackled on a global scale.
Nevertheless, in developing domestic and international measures, the formulations
adopted by other jurisdictions may provide instances of applicable legislative and
regulatory models. The British Home Office and Internet Service Providers Association
provision". The court, in stating that the breadth of the CDA was "wholly unprecedented",
acknowledged the Internet shared "no comparable history" including regulation and supervision,
with other communication mediums. The court declined to consider the Fifth Amendment
issue, instead relying on the overbreadth inquiry in regard to the First Amendment. The
vagueness of the legislation, of particular concern due to the content based regulation and
criminal penalties, imposed "an especially heavy burden" that the Government was unable to
discharge. O'Connor J, with whom the Chief Justice joined, dissented in part, arguing that the
CDA be sustained to the extent it does not substantially interfere with the First Amendment
rights of adults. Although acknowledging the Internet remains largely "unzoned", O'Connor J's
reasoning is predicated on the potential "transformation" of Cyberspace to approximate the
physical world's characteristics of geography and identity.
Http://www.aclu.org/court/renovacludec.html.
79 For a greater exposition on the origins and development of the Internet, see E Krol The Whole
Internet User's Guide (Special Edition, O'Reilly & Associates, Inc, Sebastopol, 1994).
80 Thereby leaving up to 30% of sexually explicit content, generated outside the United States,
unregulated, see above n 64,940.
81 The court in Shea declined, based on its other conclusions, to rule on whether the statute's
ineffectiveness would render it constitutionally defective, above n 64,940.
82 S Weatherall "Internet Service Providers Association - Update" 4 IT Law Today, 1996, 5, 6.
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have advanced a draft code of practice, founded on a "reasonable endeavours principle",83
which recognises that an ISPs editorial control may vary considerably, and qualifies
obligations accordingly.
The Australian federal classification scheme, implemented by the Classification
(Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995, represents a cooperative approach
between the commonwealth, states and territories.84 The establishment of classification
guidelines under the legislation provides the foundation for classification codes in relation
to television broadcasting and reflects an ethos of consistent classification across mediums,
recognising that applicable methods may differ. The proposed extension of such a regime to
online services, given the implementation of a "national strategy aimed at the adoption of
new information and communications services and technologies",85 as variously defined, is
manifested in the constitution of several independent federal investigations.
The Bulletin Board Task Force,86 which terms of reference were to examine and
establish regulatory options for BBSs,87 was criticised for addressing archaic ideals in its
assumption of system administrators control over access and content.88 The Task Force
identified several regulatory schemes, ranging from the application of classification and
offence provisions to the formulation and adoption of industry guidelines.89
The Information and Communications Services Policy Group, which issued a
consultation paper on the regulation of on-line information services,90 was subsequently
directed to stimulate consultation on developing the above recommendations and their
application to broader telecommunications capabilities.91 The Australian Broadcasting
Authority also issued a consultation paper in its investigation into the content of on-line
83 What is considered reasonable for an ISP to take responsibility for, or maintain control of, will
depend on practical and technical limitations, see above n 82.
84 See "Consultation Paper on the Regulation of On-line Information Services" (July 1995)
http://www.dca.gov.au/pubs/paper_2.html.
85 Above n 84.
86 Established by the Minister for Communications and the Arts, and the Attorney-General in
November 1993; and reported on 5 October 1994, see above n 84.
87 See above n 84.
88 A criticism which can be made of the TCR Bill; see Australian Computer Society "Submission on
the Regulation of Bulletin Board Systems" http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Regulate/.
89 See above n 84.
90 Published 7 July 1995, see above n 84.
91 This can be accredited to the substantial decline in closed, proprietary BBSs, see above n 88.
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services and the appropriateness of developing a code of practice.92 In recognising that a
technologically specific approach to the issue would be redundant, both bodies focussed on
the application of existing classification standards to Internet content. The papers
contemplate industry self-regulation and the establishment of a complaints review system
coupled with a national education strategy. The problems associated with liability of
access providers storing or transmitting content without knowledge or intent and the
enforcement of offence provisions are addressed through the recommendation of defences
where providers take reasonable steps to control content or reasonably believe content not
to be objectionable or restricted.93
The above approach, while admitting certain technical limitations, persists in the
pursuit of legislative and regulatory control over easily identified entities. The adoption of
a code of practice, while allowing more dynamic and reflective change in line with
technological advances,94 continues to concentrate on subjecting access providers to offence
provisions with limited and infeasible defences.95
The admission that "no single national body can have effective control over the content
and regulation of on-line services available in a particular country"96 has not dissuaded
the enactment of state and territorial legislation based on the above recommendations. The
Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) (Enforcement) Act 1995 (Victoria)
and the Censorship Act 1995 (Western Australia) embody the above characterisation of
universal offence provisions subject to arguably innocuous defences. New South Wales has
rejected draft legislation, parallel to those above, in order to establish an industry code of
practice as developed by the Australian Broadcasting Authority,97
V CONCLUSION
Although media have acquired the functions of the press, they have not yet obtained the
rights of the press. The rate of technological change has outstripped the ability of the law,
lurching from one precedent to another, to address new realities. Novel communications are
92 The authority's reporting date was set at 30 June 1996.
93 See above n 84.
94 An independent complaints review system would also address administrative justice issues
between providers and users, a subject beyond the scope of this article.
95 Similar criticisms to those made in ACLU and Shea can be made in regard to subjecting providers
to the expense and stigma of raising a defence in a criminal trial, and that the reasonable steps
defence cannot be claimed if no reasonable or feasible content restrictions exist.
96 "Issues Paper on the Investigation into the Content of On-Line Services" (Dec 1995)
http://www.dca.gov.au/aba/hpcov.htm.
97 See "Censor's hands off the Internet" Australian Financial Review, Australia, July 12, 1996, 55.
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pressed into service while still in their infancy, and the legal system's initial encounters with
these newborns have a lasting influence.98
The legal fascination with precedent and analogy may appear opposed to the
development of a reflective and informed jurisprudence concerning emerging technologies.
However, such reasoning may, if tempered by the realities of modern telecommunications,
imbue the judicial and regulatory approach to technological advancements with an
awareness of the necessarily resulting societal change.99
The interconnected nature of the current Internet, replete with redundant routes,
requires that the interception of information, to be effective, must occur at either the source
or destination. Censorship at an intermediary node can be freely circumvented and the
immense volume of information generated daily, together with private encryption
techniques,100 preclude effectual monitoring. As the point of dissemination, at least for New
Zealand and most countries outside the United States, is primarily extra-territorial the
realisation is that "we can meet diverse needs by controlling reception rather than
distribution".101
"Governments will need to take pro-active stances in instructing rather than
legislating".102 The current censorship laws in New Zealand, although potentially
draconian, are capable of prosecuting instances of abuse and prohibiting the storage or
recording of objectionable material on computer hardware. Legislation, if applicable at
all,103 cannot focus on the common carriers which operate the networks and provide
connection to the Internet, and must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the increasing
technological convergence of traditional media.
98 RF Goldman "Put another Log on the Fire, there's a Chill on the Internet: the effect of Applying
Current Anti-obscenity laws to Online Communications" (1995) 29 Geo L Rev 1075, 1075.
99 Hass argues that technological revolutions have highlighted the nature of the current received
moral tradition that is our rightful inheritance but which has been almost irretrievably lost, see J
Haas "Thinking Ethically about Technology"
http://www.ee.gannon.edu/-frezza/papers/Johnhaas,
100 Encryption software is freely available on the Intenet, see Bellsouth New Zealand, Submission on
the Technology and Crimes Reform Bill, August 1994.
101 Council of the Internet Society of New Zealand Inc, Submission on the Technology and Crimes
Reform Bill, July 1996, 4.
102 Above n 2.
103 For a critical assessment of legislative models in relation to the Internet, see J Kay "Sexuality, Live
without a Net: Regulating Obscenity and Indecency on the Global Network" (1995) 4 S Cal
Interdisciplinary LJ 355.
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The development and adoption of codes of conduct for Internet providers, in establishing
required complaints procedures and industry standards, cannot exist as an isolated
measure but must be coupled with education and inculcation of user responsibility.
Technological developments, such as the recent evolution of screening software,104 should
be encouraged, and the co-operation of nations, with a view to establishing feasible
solutions, instituted and maintained.
104 See above n 79.
